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The historical importance of multi-employer,  
national pay bargaining to the UK general printing sector. 
 
Introduction 
 
Printed on the dust cover of Child’s (1967) study of industrial relations in the UK printing 
industry are the words: 
 
In printing, more that most other industries, to understand the present 
problems requires a knowledge of the past. Tradition and precedent always 
play a strong part in craft union ideology, and the printers’ unions have 
become a byword for their close control of the use of labour. 
 
This passage reflects the sentiments of this paper, which aims to show how the historical 
development of multi-employer national bargaining has shaped contemporary patterns of 
joint regulation in the general print sector. Such an analysis helps explain why the changing 
content of bargaining issues has become a central tenet to the continuity of the agreement. 
The significance of this study lies in the enduring commitment to national, multi-employer 
bargaining in the general print sector of the printing industry as a means for resolving 
industrial relations issues in that sector. It places the phenomenon of national bargaining 
within the wider context of a diminishing reliance of this method of industrial relations in the 
manufacturing sector of the UK economy, particularly in the face of an adverse economic 
and political climate that has prevailed throughout the 1980s – 1990s.  The dynamic 
characteristic of the agreement is illustrated through a commentary on the infrequent disputes 
that have interrupted the fluency of the agreement and how a dispute in the early 1990s 
brought to prominence the issues of flexibility and training to the national agreement. 
 
The historical focus of this paper will go some way to explaining the contemporary structure 
and dynamics of the sector and the importance of multi-employer bargaining to key actors in 
general print. Central to this are the issues that become the focus of bargaining; and how 
concessions can help, on the one hand, to smooth the path for change for employers, while on 
the other, help maintain some control in the workplace for union members affected by the 
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changes. The paper begins by explaining the nature, size and structure of the general print 
sector, introduces the key actors in national bargaining and assesses the historical 
development of joint regulation during the post-war period.  Against this historical backcloth, 
the skirmishing over the content and survival of joint regulation are considered from 1979. 
 
The nature, size and structure of the General Printing Sector 
The printing industry today continues to be a major contributor to the UK economy. A 
Keynote publication reports that the “UK printing industry comes within the larger category 
of printing and publishing” and that this category is the UK’s fifth largest industry with a 
total turnover in 1999 of £24.68bn, of which printing accounted for £12.08bn (2000: p 5). 
The UK printing industry comprises of a newspaper sector and a general printing sector that 
is a diverse and complex sector, and which forms the focus of this paper. Rainnie concurs 
that general print “is a diverse and far from homogenous sector” citing Delafons’ observation 
that the industry “is composed of such a conglomeration of producing units, varying so much 
in size, in kinds of output, in methods and processes, in efficiency and quality, in structure, in 
organisation, in ownership and grouping, as to make almost any generalisation no more than 
narrowly applicable at best” (1989: p 100)1 David Ross, Economic Advisor to the BPIF, 
claims that, despite printings’ prominent position in the UK economy, it is one of the least 
documented. This, he claims, is partly because it has never been seen as a glamorous industry 
and partly because of its fragmented nature. And yet, Ross claims, printing is an industry 
which “serves all sectors of the economy including public authorities, financial services, 
publishers, distributive services and the manufacturing industry” and that “there is virtually 
no business that does not need a printer” (quoted in Keynote, 2000: p 2). A BPIF publication 
argues that the “structure of the UK printing industry reflects the diversity of its products and 
fragmented nature of its market with less than 20 printing companies employing more than 
500 people and only around 550 employing between 50 and 499 people. These companies 
tend to specialise in a narrow range of products in national and international markets. There 
is a vast army of small firms, more than 12,000, which usually are general printers catering 
for a local market” (1999, Infofile) 
 
                                                 
1 The diversity of the sector is reflected in the wide range of printed products, including  magazine and eriodical 
production; advertising literature; books, brochures, children’s books and leaflets; packaging; business cards 
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A Labour Market Survey report indicates that for printing and service activities related to 
printing there were 197,700 employed in this sector at December 1999 of whom 134,300 
were full-time male employees; 3,800 were part-time male employees; 51,000 were full-time 
female employees; and 8,600 were part-time female employees. Both the BPIF and Printing 
2000 claim that 170,000 of these workers are employed in the general print sector. These 
statistics demonstrate that the printing industry is still dominated by male full-time 
employment, a phenomenon that has changed little over its history despite the technological 
changes that have been introduced to the industry. Printing 2000 notes that historically 
women in the industry were usually found in the low grade jobs in the finishing departments 
of firms, but claims that “Today women are rightly climbing to every level of printing 
management” and further claims that “Modern computerised machinery represents no barrier 
to female skills and women are finding their place in sophisticated production roles” (p 37). 
 
 Unfortunately, these claims are not borne out by the statistics on employment in the general 
printing industry. The BPIF figures for Modern Apprenticeship and Trainee intake into the 
industry record that only 7.5% of recruits since 1995 were female (source: BPIF Training, 
London), a figure that is mirrored in the intake figures for print related training at West Herts 
College (source: West Herts College). There is little support from the evidence of a local 
survey undertaken in printing firms located the Herts and Essex area (see Healy et al, 2001: p 
6). This survey produced scant evidence of women employed in the skilled areas of 
production and found that their employment was generally confined to the finishing 
departments and in administration. Such findings are in line with the research undertaken by 
Webster who claims the SPRU Women and Technology Studies survey (1982) confirmed 
that women “in printing and publishing were concentrated in labour intensive office and 
unskilled production operations” (1996: p 71).       
 
The parties to national bargaining. 
A distinguishing feature of industrial relations in the general printing sector is the role played 
by both the trade union and the employers’ association in maintaining a national agreement 
that covers an array of issues including minimum pay for grade rates, the length of the 
working week, overtime and shift premia, holidays and holiday pay, sick pay, a disputes and 
                                                                                                                                                       
and stationery; programs and tickets; printed labels; business forms; security printing; diaries and calendars; and 
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grievance procedure and training for the sector. This is one of the last remaining examples of 
multi-employer collective bargaining that exists in the private, manufacturing sector and the 
agreement and is reviewed annually by the Graphical Paper and Media Union (GPMU), 
representing workers interests, and the British Printing Industries Federation (BPIF), 
representing the employers.  
 
The influential WIRS/WERS survey series have depicted the move away from multi-
employer pay bargaining in the UK economy (see Culley et al, 1999: pp 187-188).  However, 
despite this growing trend, the BPIF continues to be a major participant in industrial relations 
in the general printing sector. The BPIF is a national organization representing companies in 
printing, typesetting, plate-making and bookbinding. The member companies control the 
management of the organization and, while industrial relations is seen to be their primary 
role, the federation also acts in the capacity of a commercial trade association2. The history 
of employer federation in general printing reveals a resilient pattern of tradition within the 
industry. Howe traces the origins of the Federation of Master Printers and Allied Trades of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (FMP) back to its inception in 1901 and 
records that the then federations’ function was to co-ordinate the activities of the many local 
organizations that were then in existence (1950: pp 1-5). The federation, later to become 
known as the British Federation of Master Printers (BFMP), changed its name again in 1974 
to the BPIF, a move that Gennard claims was designed to reflect the emphasis of the 
organization away from a master-servant relationship to the more politically acceptable 
management-employee status (1990: p 16).  
 
Until 1980 the BPIF and the Newspaper Society (NS) negotiated jointly with the print unions 
in a multi-employer forum for the industry3. A dispute over the introduction of the thirty-
                                                                                                                                                       
postcards and greetings cards. 
2 For a commentary on the duel role of Employers’ Associations see Sisson (1983); and Salamon (1998) 
3 Traditionally, the craft unions were recognised as being able to wield a high degree of unilateral power over 
employers. Hobsbawm argues “the whole point of the classical craft union was to keep the trade, and entry to 
the trade, restricted – quite apart from the actuarial arguments for excluding those less healthy or qualified 
workers who would merely drain the union funds while weakening bargaining strength in other ways (1964: p 
323). Clegg et al noted that, early in the 19th century, “printers had developed their methods of control beyond 
the capacity of most other crafts” and had, via the chapel organisation, “mobilized shop solidarity” (1964: p 10). 
Howe traces the early beginnings of multi-employer bargaining in the industry and records that in a response to 
the disparate claims for advances in terms and conditions from the individual print unions it was agreed in 1920 
that a conference should take place between the Employer’s Federation and a union delegation representing all 
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seven and a half hour week in 1980 had led to the temporary ending of the agreements. 
Gennard (in his history of the National Graphical Association (NGA)) records that the 
“BPIF’s attempt to lock out the NGA was a fiasco”. The BPIF member companies could not 
match the solidarity shown by union members and “by the end of 1980 the vast majority of 
NGA members, who worked under the BPIF agreement, were covered by interim deals 
which met the union’s claim” (1990: p 412). The NS had not shown the same disunity. 
Gennard argues that, “unlike the BPIF, the Newspaper society was not in disarray”. He 
claims that their lock-out had been more effective and that they had been able to continue 
production with the aid of non-union personnel. This ability was “a lesson that was not 
forgotten by NS members when they set about implementing new technology in the mid-
1980s” (1990: p 415). After the 1980 dispute the NS carried out separate negotiations with 
the unions, but ultimately ended their national agreement with the NUJ in 1987 (Smith and 
Morton, 1990: p 107) and with NGA/SOGAT in 1991 (Smith and Morton, 1993: p 107).  
 
The lead given by the NS in adopting policies of union exclusion culminating in the ending 
of collective agreements has not been followed in the general printing sector. Despite the 
strain that the BPIF agreement has been under in recent times both sides have persevered to 
maintain the agreement. This is possibly a reflection of the differences in the dynamism of 
the two sectors. The concentration of ownership in the newspaper sector and the homogenous 
character of the product are in clear contrast to the general print sector that is dominated by 
small employer units producing a diverse range of products. These differences made for 
differing approaches in dealing with ‘the union issue’. The large groups in newspaper 
production had the ability to buy out the terms and conditions of skilled union members, by 
way of enhanced redundancy payments, and to replace them with a lower paid alternative 
workforce (see Smith and Morton, 1990: pp 114-115). Conversely, in the general trade, with 
its pervasiveness of small employers and diverse product base, the trend has been more 
towards the marginalisation of union influence through the national agreement. This would 
reflect the view of Smith and Morton that, outside of newspapers, “union exclusion would 
remain the exception” (1990: p 120).  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
unions under the banner of the Printing and Kindred Trades Federation (P&KTF). While this forum was itself 
fraught with difficulties it non-the–less set the pattern for future agreements (p 76).    
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In the period up to 1982 there had been a polarization of workers into two unions, divided on 
a craft/non-craft basis. Ostensibly, the NGA (1982) represented  craft workers in the industry 
while the Society of Graphical and Allied Trades (SOGAT 1982) represented the semi-
skilled and un-skilled workers, although there was some blurring around the edges. The NGA 
was a predominately male dominated union while SOGAT catered for a higher proportion of 
women members, mostly employed in bench and finishing work in binderies and among 
clerical grades.  
 
The technological changes that were rapidly being introduced into the industry were breaking 
down what had previously been clear demarcation lines in the production areas and as a 
consequence was bringing members into conflict with each other. A graphic description of 
this scenario is presented by Darlington in his case study of a Merseyside print factory, who, 
in summarizing the position, argues: 
 
the isolation of any action to the particular section of an individual chapel merely 
had the effect of reinforcing departmental and chapel sectionalism, and again 
threw away the opportunity of forging shop-floor links and building up a unified 
approach towards management. Whilst the lack of such a joint stance…may not 
have appeared to have seriously hampered the power of union organization 
during the 1970s there is no doubt it underlay the erosion of strength of the 
chapels during the 1980s. 
                                                                                                       (1994: p 279) 
                                                                                                                            
There had been a clarion call from the top tables of both union conferences for an 
amalgamation between SOGAT and the NGA throughout the 1980s. It was stressed that only 
through uniting would the employers be unable to set one union against the other. Gennard 
and Bain report that the SOGAT 1984 Biennial Delegate Conference “accepted that with the 
current warfare between the two unions there was an urgent need for them to amalgamate 
speedily into one union and that such action should take place as a matter of urgency”. The 
authors claim that there was recognition of the fact “The longer SOGAT and the NGA were 
apart, the greater the opportunity for inter-union conflict as the implementation of new 
technology increased the overlapping interests of the two unions” (1995: p 195). 
Consequently, in 1991 the NGA and SOGAT put their differences behind them and 
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amalgamated to form one union for the industry, the GPM). This amalgamation, that was to 
be the last in a long line of printing unions that had come together over the years, was not 
necessarily “born out of a love of each other” but rather, because a failure to amalgamate 
“would not resolve the inter-union disputes between SOGAT and the NGA. It was only 
through coming together to form one union that such problems could be permanently 
resolved” (Gennard and Bain 1995: p 238).  
 
This, however, was not to be a speedy amalgamation. The General Secretary’s address to the 
1990 NGA Biennial Delegate refers to the six years of long, hard and difficult negotiations 
that had preceded this conference and that the recommendation to support amalgamation had 
not been arrived at lightly. The General Secretary warned delegates that failure to deliver the 
amalgamation would mean “the ability to do what we exist for – protect our members’ 
employment and enhance their wages and conditions – will inevitably commence a sharp and 
unstoppable decline”. He reminded delegates of the perilous position that the union had 
found itself in the newspaper sector as a result of inter-union haggling and the subsequent 
loss of union influence and that unless the union presented a united front “it would be 
inevitable that, with the advance of technology, more anti-union legislation and increased 
inter-union strife, our influence over the general printing industry, where the main bulk of 
our membership is employed, will likewise decline” (1990: p 75). Today the amalgamated 
union presents a united front to the employer on the aspirations of their membership. This 
approach is at its most visible in the multi-employer forum that negotiates the terms of the 
national agreement that sets the benchmark for the industry. Newsome argues that one reason 
for this position is the traditionally high degree of employer and employee organisation and 
that “these prevailing structures of collective workplace regulation, most notably through 
national collective agreements, is in part testimony to these strong levels of workplace 
organisation” (2000: p 507).           
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Industrial relations in the general print sector – ‘the dark days of the past’. 
There is an imagery of industrial relations in the general printing industry that portrays a 
battle that is constantly taking place over control of the workplace. Francis presents a recent 
example of this type of perception in her leader column in Printweek (17th November 2000), 
where she postulates that the GPMU is required to modernize its approach ‘in an industry 
with a long history of poor industrial relations’ where many ‘managers are of an age group 
who remember all too well the dark days of the past’. She goes on to argue that the GPMU 
needs to ‘adjust its mindset to the present and future realities of today’s industry’ (p 20). 
These comments were immediately refuted by the GPMU General Secretary, Tony Dubbins, 
who retorted that such remarks were ‘utter rubbish’ and enquired as to the source of her 
knowledge ‘as all of our records, including government records, suggest that this has not 
been the case for many years’. Dubbins goes on to express his point of view that the GPMU 
is willing and able to work in partnership with progressive employers and that this  
 
Is the way forward for our industry, and the GPMU is, as always, willing to play 
its part in ensuring the industry, companies and GPMU members, have a positive 
outlook for the future and work towards the goals of profitability, efficiency and 
job security, while at the same time safeguarding our members’ terms and 
conditions in a sensible and constructive way 
                                                             (Printweek, 8th. December, 2000: p 19). 
 
This type of exchange is indicative of the perception of a hostile relationship that exists 
between management and union in the typical printing establishment, and yet the scant 
evidence that is available on this matter does not appear to support this position. The only 
recorded all out strike across the printing sector took place in 19594. Roe remarks on the 
uniqueness of this strike situation across the sector, arguing that, in a dispute where “on 20 
June [1959] 120,000 printing workers ceased work; 4000 printers and 1000 newspaper 
offices were affected. The strike was to last six weeks and a large part of the union 
membership engaged in strike action for the first time” (1999, p 164: my emphasis). 
Gennard, in his account of the dispute, sums up the reactions of both sides declaring: 
                                                 
4 Detailed accounts of this dispute can be found in Child (1967), Gennard (1990) and Gennard and Bain (1995) 
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The 1959 strike had been a traumatic experience for both sides. There was a 
feeling that the situation should not be allowed to arise again. Many on both sides 
thought, in retrospect, that the dispute had been a self inflicted wound since in the 
final analysis both side had to settle their differences round the table…There had 
been little effort to close the gap between the two sides and tempers at times were 
high. Both the unions and employers realized that, now the dispute was over, they 
must continue to live together and there was little purpose in laying the blame for 
what had gone before. A fresh start was needed.       
                                                                                              (1990, pp 385-386) 
 
Gennard turns his attention to the issue that, between 1968-1989, the NGA were involved in 
a series of disputes over the introduction of new technology into the industry but makes the 
distinction that “the bulk of these disputes were in the newspaper field and some of them, 
particularly the Messenger and Wapping disputes, were the focus of heavy media attention” 
(1990: p 468)5. It is therefore important, in the first instance, to understand the structure of 
the printing sector, of which the general printing trade forms a part. Gennard (in his history 
of the NGA) argues that the media attention attributed to the newspaper unrest “created the 
impression in the minds of the general public that the NGA is predominately a newspaper 
union”, but provides statistics to show that this was far from true and that in fact only 8% of 
the total membership of the NGA was employed in newspaper production (ibid). Elgar and 
Simpson reiterate this distinction arguing their “research on the trade union side confirmed 
that the newspaper and general printing sectors were seen to be quite distinct and that 
management – and trade union – approaches in the two sectors were markedly different”. 
The writers go on to highlight the extent of change that the industry has undergone between 
the 1970s and the 1990s and how, in contrast to the newspaper sector, “considerable change 
had been achieved in printing without major confrontations with the unions” (1994: p 11). 
                                                 
5 For an account of the significance of the Wapping dispute to the print unions see P. Bain in Historical Studies 
in Industrial Relations (1998: pp 73-105). He argues, “The dispute’s effects were also acutely felt by SOGAT 
and the NGA. The exodus of national newspapers from Fleet Street quickened and the workforce fell from 
30.000 to 15,000 between 1985 and 1990…It is difficult to exaggerate the dispute’s significance for the unions, 
but it also showed the employer’s iron determination.”.  Bain also makes the point that “The need for a single 
print union was also underlined by the events, and renewed SOGAT-NGA talks led to the formation of the 
GPMU in 1991” (p 101).  
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Therefore it would appear that a distinction must be drawn between industrial relations in the 
newspaper and general print sectors.  
 
Not only is there a distinction in the approach to industrial relations between the newspaper 
and general printing sectors, one can also detect a discernable difference in how industrial 
relations is managed in general printing compared to trends in private sector manufacturing. 
Set within the context of the prominence of a national agreement for the industry it could be 
argued that the preferred method of dealing with industrial relations in general print flies in 
the face of convention. According to Millward et al, multi-employer bargaining in the 
manufacturing sector became almost a rarity, and had all but disappeared in private services 
(2000: p 221). This demise in multi-employer bargaining has coincided with the adverse 
climate, both economic and political, that has prevailed and impinged upon industrial 
relations during the 1980s -1990s.  
 
The Conservatives came to power in 1979 claiming that, with unemployment standing at one 
million, ‘Britain wasn’t working’ under a labour administration and put the blame full square 
on the overbearing power of the trade unions. Hutton records the incoming Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher’s disdain of the unions including their association with collective 
bargaining, corporatism and Keynesian economics. Hutton claims that the Conservatives had 
adopted an initiative that embraced the laissez-faire philosophy of the New Right and that 
“This ‘monetarist’ philosophy neatly dovetailed with the long-standing prejudices of the 
Conservative right, because it presented a heaven-sent justification for the crusade against all 
collectivism” (1996, p 69). The author argues that, in her quest to change the existing state of 
affairs, Mrs. Thatcher 
 
was aided not only by her visceral conviction that British corporatism had had its 
day and that trade unions were malevolent but also by the revival and 
representation of classical economics’ description of how a capitalist economy 
should be managed. Her own prejudices were the spur; popular disaffection with 
the trade unions gave her a political base; and New Right economics provided the 
compass for a ruthless campaign against trade union power which, fifteen years 
later, has transformed the British labour market 
                                                                                                         (1996: p 89)    
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This transformation saw unemployment rise to unprecedented post war highs. Edwards et al 
record that, while unemployment rose in all OECD countries, “What marked Britain out was 
a particularly rapid increase between 1979 and 1983” a situation which saw British 
unemployment peak at 3.2 million workers by 1986. The authors go on to highlight the boom 
bust experience of the UK economy over the 1980s-1990s and the ensuing sense of job 
insecurity for many workers (1995: p 8).  Edwards et al  argue the “divisions between those 
in good jobs and those in bad jobs or with no jobs at all have widened” (1995: p 2). 
Accompanying this transformation was the issue of trade union de-recognition by employers. 
Millward et al reveal that “Recognition in the private sector fell progressively from 50 per 
cent in 1980 to 25 per cent in 1998” (2000: p 97). Within these statistics there is evidence of 
large scale de-recognition in the national and provincial newspaper and the publishing sectors 
(see Claydon 1989, and Smith and Morton 1993) and yet this is a scenario that was not 
replicated by employers in the general print sector. The National Agreement has survived this 
economic and political turmoil and is still setting the benchmark for the industry today.   
 
The resilience of national bargaining in the general print sector may well be a reflection of 
the structural composition of the industry. The findings of an 1988 ACAS report supports the 
argument that “industries which have a highly competitive market, which are composed of a 
large number of small companies each with a small market share, which are labour intensive 
or which are geographically concentrated will, other things being equal, tend to have multi-
employer bargaining”(p 33). To a great extent the general print sector falls into this category. 
Rainnie reminds us that “printers tend to operate in a confined sphere” and that “a marked 
feature of the industry is its large numbers of small family firms” (1989: p 100). It is against 
this background that the advantages of a national agreement in the sector can be seen. The 
ACAS criteria of multi-employer bargaining creating a degree of wage stability within a 
“highly competitive product market, where “each company’s ability to pass on wage 
increases through price increases is limited” (1988: p 25), fits well. ACAS also make the 
point that small companies prefer this arrangement “because they usually lack the resources 
to obtain information on pay in comparable firms and to design their own pay structures” (p 
26). Further, the national agreement brings to federated employers the operation of a disputes 
procedure.   In 1983, Sisson claimed that “the handling of disputes continues to be highly 
valued by the member-firms” and goes on to claim that “the industries in which the largest 
proportion of member-firms reported an increase in the use of procedure are paper and 
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printing” (1983: p 128). More recently, Arrowsmith et al claim “The national framework was 
valued by most small firms firstly to save themselves the trouble of bargaining, and secondly 
because the annual pay increase was a cash award linked to national scales which were 
normally well below actual rates” (2000: p 21).  
 
The question arises as to whom the ‘BPIF’ agreement impacts upon? There are many 
companies who are not in membership of the BPIF. Many of the larger organizations have 
followed the trend of withdrawing from multi-employer bargaining and prefer to deal with 
their own industrial relations in-house. This has certainly been the case at St. Ives and the 
British Printing Corporation (BPC) before their amalgamation with Watmoughs to form 
Polestar. However, the GPMU would argue that none of these companies have agreements at 
local level that are inferior to BPIF terms and conditions.  
The union’s executive council report for the 1997 conference makes the point that “BPC is 
not a member of the BPIF but in many instances their Agreements run parallel with the terms 
and conditions of the BPIF” (1997: p 10). In 1999 the executive report noted the St.Ives 
Group had implemented BPIF wage awards over many years, though not a member (1999: p 
9). Watmoughs, prior to their amalgamation with BPC to form Polestar, were not a federated 
company, but followed the provisions of the agreement at their sites. It is also the case that 
there are a large number of small companies not in BPIF membership who follow the 
agreement and where their employees are balloted on the negotiated terms because their 
company are considered to be working under the umbrella of the agreement. This scenario of 
maintaining market comparability for terms and conditions of employment is a situation 
referred to by Arrowsmith and Sisson who make the case that even where multi-employer 
bargaining has ceased to exist, as in engineering, it does not appear to follow that the level of 
settlement at local level is much different to comparable competitors and they detect an 
inclination for employers in a sector to “continue to move like ships in a convoy” where there 
are “broad similarities of practice” (1999: p 63).   
 
The resilience of the national agreement since 1979 
Despite the adverse prevailing economic and political climate and, in the aftermath of the 
dispute that took place in 1980 over the reduction in the working week, and the subsequent 
resurrection of the national agreement in 1981, the ‘BPIF’ agreement provided a relatively 
undisturbed formula for the terms and conditions of employment in the general printing 
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sector over the next ten years. This period saw rises in pay and longer holidays for workers. 
Gennard and Bain record that over the period 1981-1991, the minimum earnings guarantee in 
the provinces had risen by 101% and by 100% in London (1995: p 474). The continuation of 
the agreement was not without pain for the unions. The NGA “accepted full flexibility of 
labour in the origination and machine departments and arrangements to enable full 
cooperation at national, branch and local level in changes necessary to achieve increased 
output and lower unit costs through the most effective use of people, material and machines” 
(Gennard, 1990: p 417). For their part, SOGAT “made concessions in the deployment of 
their members designed to improve efficiency and productivity”. They also accepted “the 
ending of demarcation lines between warehouse, bookbinding, print finishing, stationery, 
carton converting and printing departments” (Gennard and Bain, 1995: pp 475-476). From a 
management point of view, Bennington, at a BPIF conference, argued “the national 
agreements since 1980 have achieved acceptable agreements for the industry and have made 
progress on productivity and efficiency” (1993: p4).    
 
The signs of strain on the agreement began to appear after 1991. 1992 saw the agreement 
only narrowly carried by the membership of the newly formed GPMU. The GPMU figures 
for the ballot show 26,532 in favour with 21,715 against, a majority of only 4,817. The main 
problems to emerge in the implementation of this agreement were that the new money 
increase was to be introduced in two stages in April and August, as opposed to the 
established custom of being paid in April, and that many companies were indicating that they 
were not in a position to pay anything, despite the settlement. The GPMU responded to the 
threat of non-payment by circulating its membership employed in ‘BPIF’ companies arguing 
that the low monetary element of the settlement reflected the ‘current economic 
circumstances of the industry and should therefore enable even the smallest companies to 
pay’ (circular 105/92). In the light of this and the narrow majority of the ballot in favour, the 
union recommended taking ballots for industrial action in companies who indicated that they 
were not prepared to meet the increase. To this end the union issued sample ballot papers for 
limited industrial action, short of a strike, and for strike action, to its branches. Examples of 
companies yielding to this ploy were to be found at the Martins Group, Garnet Dickson, 
Hardy Business Forms and W.C. Cowells (see Telford, 1995: p 31).  
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It was against the troubled background of the 1992 settlement that the BPIF undertook to 
review their industrial relations policy. A Review document (IR93/01) setting out the 
federation’s ‘Industrial Relations Strategic Objectives’ for the next five years supported the 
retention of a national agreement, recommending an annual review, but brought into play the 
issue of a company’s ability to pay any agreed increase in pay. Other objectives were laid 
down in a BPIF press statement (21/1/93) which argued that “Widening differentials in pay 
between skilled and unskilled employees, making shift and overtime working more cost 
effective, and formulating a new job grading structure based on the application of skills are 
identified as our prime goals” (p 1). For their part, the GPMU were formulating their claim 
for the 1993/1994 period. The adopted approach was a departure from the normal practice of 
presenting a ‘shopping list’ of items, some of which could be offset against any concessions 
by the BPIF. In this pay round the GPMU settled on three items, a sixth week of holiday, a 
substantial wage increase and pro-rata terms and conditions for part-time and casual workers 
in the industry. A press statement laying out the details of the claim, along with evidence 
purported to support the viability of their claim, was issued just prior to the initial meeting of 
the respective negotiating panels in February 1993. The GPMU made it clear that they 
expected the BPIF to deliver on all three counts. 
 
Talks between the parties eventually broke down with the GPMU then adopting an 
aggressive approach by taking their claim to individual employers in an attempt to reach a 
house agreement. The claim from the GPMU to individual companies was for a class 1 
increase of £8.03 per week, £7.47 for class 2 and £7.12 for class 3; a minimum earnings 
guarantee of £162.80; along with the provision of an extra days holiday in 1994; and an 
agreement on terms and conditions for part-time and temporary workers. The union targeted 
groups of companies where ballots for industrial action were to be held in support of the 
claim. Targeted companies were also to include non-federated companies such as the St. Ives 
Group, a move intended to stop federated companies resigning their membership. In 
response, the BPIF advised their members that talks had broken down and they were now 
free “to make their own arrangements as to what (if any) award to make to their employees” 
(IRS, 331: p 6). They issued a booklet to members, ‘After national bargaining – guidance 
notes to member companies’, and provided support, advice and negotiating assistance from 
their regional offices to member companies. The breakthrough for the GPMU came with a 
settlement at the Lawson Marden Group, a major player in the BPIF, where an agreement 
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was reached which saw a new money increase of £6.50 for class 1 with proportionate 
increases for class 2 and class 3 workers, an extra days holiday from 1994, and pro-rata terms 
for part-time and temporary workers. This agreement set the benchmark for the GPMU 
campaign and chapels were urged to push for this level of settlement. 
 
The GPMU claimed great success in this campaign. They issued a series of newsletters 
listing the companies who had signed an agreement that matched the Lawson Marsden deal 
and also released the profit margins and the salaries of directors of companies who were 
refusing to reach a settlement. By the summer of 1993 the GPMU were claiming an 85% 
success rate for their members covered by the ‘BPIF’ agreement. In his review of the dispute 
Gall concurs that the campaign was to a great extent a success for the GPMU. In his 
assessment of the campaign he accepts that “the GPMU does appear to have won the 
propaganda war and the battle on the ground although not necessarily hands down” (1994:p 
18). Gall suggests that employers took the threat of industrial action seriously, to the extent 
that: 
 
Given the success of the campaign and the far fewer cases of industrial action 
than ballots, it is fairly clear that many employers were convinced that the union 
had the membership support to conduct effective industrial action. 
                                                                                                         (1994: p 20) 
                                                                                                                           
Any hopes that the GPMU leadership had of reaching an agreement for 1993/1994 with the 
BPIF were scotched by the very success of the campaign. It would have been impractical to 
have resumed negotiations that might have reached a settlement that fell short of the increase 
that had been achieved in so many of the companies that had conceded to pressure. 
 
As a result of the 1993 dispute the whole future of national pay bargaining in the general 
print sector was called into question. The BPIF launched yet another consultation exercise 
with its members in an attempt to discover if national pay bargaining was what they really 
wanted for the industry. IRS reported on the fears that were held for the long term prospects 
of national bargaining in the industry. The paper provides details of the consultation exercise, 
reporting that the survey had been conducted amidst a climate of doubt that had been cast by 
a review group “comprised of mainly chief executives of BPIF companies” who had come to 
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the conclusion that “It is unlikely that BPIF industrial relations objectives can be delivered by 
national bargaining” (544, 1993: p 7). Despite the strong anti-national bargaining lobby that 
was evident in some quarters of the BPIF, 6 exploratory talks between the parties to discuss 
the resumption of an agreement for 1994/1995 took place in October 1993. The talks were 
held in the knowledge that the GPMU General Secretary had threatened that if the BPIF were 
not prepared to continue pay bargaining the GPMU would pull out of all national 
agreements, including disputes procedures and health and safety agreements, and declared 
that “if the BPIF do opt out, then next year’s campaign will make this year’s look like a 
picnic” (IRS, 554: p7). A Printweek article in November 1993 makes reference to what 
appeared to be “a dramatic U-turn in favour of returning to national wage negotiations” by 
the BPIF for the1994/1995 period. The article claims a joint statement declared that “Whilst 
a number of difficulties still remain, both the BPIF and the GPMU representatives believe 
that there are sufficient grounds to commence national negotiations in 1994” (5 November 
1993: p 3). The return to national pay talks was confirmed through a joint press release 
issued on the 18th November 1993. 
 
The agreement that was struck for the 1994/1995 period was seen in some quarters as the 
bare minimum that was required to get a national agreement back on track. A low monetary 
increase of £5.00 for class 1 workers, reducing down to £4.33 for class 3 workers was set. 
This represented a 2.8% increase on the minimum rates with machine and photo-composition 
extras increasing by the same amount. The agreement also included for the first time ‘a 
commitment to full cost recovery at company level, where practicable’. Gall comments that, 
in order to reach a settlement, there had to be  agreement on three main areas between the 
parties in that : 
The 1994 agreement must not disturb the position established by the 1993 
company-level negotiations i.e. there was to be no catching up clauses for 
workers at firms who did not pay the union claim, there will be cash only 
payments and a joint commitment to make any settlement self-financing through 
the removal of all demarcation leading to full flexibility 
                                                                                                         (1994: p 26) 
                                                 
6 There was an abundance of reports of statements made by leading executives such as BPIF President Nick 
Hutton’s claim that “enthusiasm [among members] for the national agreement is lower than ever before” 
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The eventual settlement was only marginally accepted by the BPIF member companies. This 
position was also true for the GPMU members. Circular 62/94 reveals the very low poll, 
which produced a vote in favour by a mere 2,877 votes. Gall alludes to the point that the 
GPMU may not have capitalized on their success in the 1993 dispute. He claims the BPIF 
felt the GPMU approach to the 1994 talks presented the impression that the GPMU “clearly 
needed a return to national negotiations badly and are prepared to make substantial 
movements to our position” (1994; p 27). Writing in the GPMU Journal the General 
Secretary of the GPMU reflected on the success of the 1993 campaign, but also reminded 
members that an unfortunate one in five of the membership covered by the BPIF agreement 
did not receive the full benefits of the campaign. He therefore welcomed the return to 
national bargaining arguing “the stability provided by the national agreement is of enormous 
benefit to our members”. He goes on to stress that the agreement sets minimum terms and 
conditions and does not preclude any branch or chapel entering into local bargaining in order 
to improve such terms and conditions so that, for workers, they “match the skills which they 
possess and the profits they help to produce. That has always been the case and long may it 
remain so” (May 1994: p 4). 
 
Despite the doubts and fears that had been cast, and the accusation from some sections of the 
GPMU membership that the union had capitulated in order to get an agreement back in place, 
the 1994 settlement paved the way for constructive discussions to take place for a 1995/1996 
agreement. Writing in the GPMU Journal the General Secretary reiterated the union 
leadership’s commitment to national agreements arguing that “they provide a level playing 
field for employers and employees in the industry, and they also provide a mechanism 
whereby change can be introduced into the industry with the minimum of fuss” (March 1995: 
p 4). An offer was recommended for acceptance by the executive council for the 1995/1996 
period. It included a class 1 increase of £6.70, representing a 3.65% increase on minimum 
rates, which at the time was ahead of inflation. The offer would establish a new class 1 
minimum earning of £190.17. The extra days holiday would be incorporated into the 
agreement from October 1997. From the employers’ point of view the offer was again 
subject to full cost recovery through improvements in productivity and efficiency at house 
level. The GPMU membership carried the proposal by a majority of 10,574 votes in another 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Printweek 1 October 1993), and Bembrose Managing Director Graham Bennington, who “felt it was very 
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unspectacular voting return with only 26,280 votes returned. The national agreement remains 
in force, the 2000-2001 agreement saw a new money increase along with the inclusion of a 
national sick pay scheme for the first time. The most recent agreement, for the 2001/2002, 
which provides a new money increase of £6.88p for class I, improvements in the sick pay 
scheme and agreement on parental leave has been agreed by a ballot of the members covered 
by the agreement (see GPMU Ballot Paper: March 2001). 
The collective bargaining issues – giving up sacred cows 
The concessions won by the union side through national bargaining were not gained without 
some sacred cows being given up by the unions, particularly those representing skilled 
workers. During the post war period from 1946-1960 the industry experienced remarkable 
expansion, Gennard argues that paper and print production witnessed an expansion of 18% as 
opposed to 8% for all manufacturing (1990: p 11). As a result of this expansion managers 
claimed that the restrictive apprenticeship quotas imposed on the industry by the unions put 
pressure on prices and hence competitiveness causing work to be sent abroad. From the 
union viewpoint, “the apprenticeship quotas were used to ensure that the demand for labour 
exceeded its supply” (Gennard, 1990: p 453, see also Gennard and Bain 1995: p 501). During 
this period of expansion the unions were seeking a reduction in the working week from 45 
hours to 40 hours per week and an increase in holiday entitlement from one week to two 
weeks. Howe records that the unions at that time justified their claim on the premise that “all 
the benefits of increased production due to new methods and faster running machinery 
should not be passed on to the consumer, but that some material improvement in the 
conditions of the workers in the industry should be made” (1950: p 205). The unions won a 
phased reduction in the working week, eventually getting it down to 40 hours by 1959 and an 
extra weeks holiday, but in return they eventually made concessions on labour intake and 
apprentice quotas.  
Ministerial interventions and courts of inquiry into the industry characterized the period from 
1946-1967. As a result of the recommendations of the courts of inquiry there were 
improvements in apprentice intake that would eventually ease manpower shortages. This 
ongoing concession was a situation that Child saw as pleasing the employers, as this 
approach “clearly demonstrated that less rigid union attitudes to labour supply, indicated in 
                                                                                                                                                       
unlikely that national pay bargaining would survive in the long term (Printweek, 5 November, 1993). 
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the 1950 settlement, was persisting” (1967: p 342). Gennard claims that during the period 
1948-66 national wage negotiations “were characterized by wages increases being traded by 
unions in return for increases in the labour supply, including apprentices” but goes on to 
argue that the unions always feared “that if entry into the industry was not limited then in 
times of recession a disproportionate number of members would be claiming the union’s 
unemployment benefit” (1990: p 453). It was the resilience of the pre-entry closed shop in 
the skilled (or craft) areas that was the focus of the employers in the 1950s and 1960s, an 
area that they considered to be regulated to the point of making the industry uncompetitive. 
However, during the 1970s the entire production side of the sector was dominated by closed 
shops, pre-entry for the skilled workers and post-entry for the semi and unskilled. Darlington 
refers to this phenomenon in his case study of a Merseyside print factory arguing that, during 
the 1960s and 1970s, not only did the skilled workers keep a tight check on labour intake, 
their semi-skilled and un-skilled counterparts acted accordingly, and effectively operated the 
local union branch office as a labour exchange (1994: pp 103-132).  
The debate over manning levels and worker intake remained prominent until the beginning of 
the 1980s from when the emphasis on training and apprentice intake has witnessed an 
ironical about face. Over the period since 1981 there has been a constant call from the union 
side for government intervention to force employers to adopt a training agenda to address the 
skill shortages that are evident in the sector. Gennard points to the great lengths the NGA 
went to in attempting to keep training on the agenda during the 1980s and into the1990s. As 
part of their negotiations with the BPIF the unions were able to secure a joint approach to 
training that encompassed not only apprentice intake, but also adult recruits to the industry, 
re-training and up-skilling for existing employees (1990: pp 456-461, see also Gennard and 
Bain, 1995: pp 504-505). This was a radical departure from the customary approach to 
apprenticeship intake and industry training. It was a view that reflected the technological 
change that has transformed the industry and continues to do so. This advance in technology 
made the unions representing skilled workers realize that their members could be lost to the 
industry if adult training was not introduced. The sweeping changes made it highly unlikely 
that a worker with a specific skill would be able to expect a job for life carrying out that 
specific task and that retraining and upskilling of adult members would be a necessity. The 
calls for changes in training policy were prompted by the fact that, due to the fall in intake of 
young people to the industry printing colleges were closing down their facilities or were 
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under threat of closure. Such developments were partly due to the fact that training in the 
1980s and 1990s had become largely unregulated in line with the ideology of the 
conservative administration, a situation reflected on by a Labour Research article on the state 
of training in the manufacturing sector claiming that, even today, “Britain’s continuing 
system of “voluntarism” in workplace training provision has meant that training and 
apprenticeship opportunities are piecemeal with no compulsion to provide anything. As a 
result even employers that did provide training slashed their recruitment budgets during lean 
times and failed to restart them as the economy picked up’ (2000: p 22).     
This newly adopted approach to training from the print unions is evident from motions 
passed at the NGA biennial delegate conference where a motion from the Three Shires 
Branch called on the executive council to “review its policies towards the encouragement and 
co-ordination of existing training resources. This must include support for local printing 
colleges and pressure on employers and suppliers to develop training and re-training policies 
to maximize opportunities for young entrants and existing members” (1990: p 199). This 
approach to training contradicts what had been the prevailing attitude prior to the 1980s 
when, despite the demands of the non-craft unions, the unions representing skilled workers 
refused to accept any progression of adults through promotion (Gennard 1990: pp 453-458). 
Today training is very much a bargaining issue on the BPIF agreement agenda but it is being 
pushed from the union side. The executive council report to the 1999 BDC refers to a survey 
undertaken of 500 print or print related companies that highlights the skills shortages and 
skill gaps that have become evident in general print due to a lack of commitment to training 
and comments that “the findings indicate there is some reluctance in the printing industry to 
recruit and train new staff” (1999: p 15). The reluctance of employers to become involved in 
training is further highlighted by a statement from the BPIF in a Print Week article claiming 
“their proposals for a printing industry Skills Action Fund has been met with “hardly any 
response – we have been deluged with apathy”. The article goes on to argue that “a voluntary 
approach to training has failed to deliver the number of skilled people the industry needs” 
and that employers have failed to respond to requests for their views on training (2000: p 4). 
As part of the most recent (2001/2002) discussions on the BPIF agreement the union and 
employers’ association have made a commitment to approach the government with a view to 
introducing a training levy into the sector to promote training for the industry.   
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The problems that the unions faced over manpower issues were compounded by the inclusion 
of flexibility and productivity and efficiency clauses introduced by employers and requiring 
the unions to make concessions in return for gains in the terms and conditions. The flexibility 
issue was raised in 1981 when the agreement was resurrected after the 1980 dispute. The 
NGA delegate conference received a report on the revised agreement that accepted flexibility 
for skilled workers across all disciplines within departments and made provision for 
addressing new manning levels on the basis of technological advancement on the proviso that 
no member would be made redundant as a result of these clauses (NGA BDC, 1982: p 14). 
This acceptance of flexibility and efficiency has been extended by subsequent agreements 
and through the amalgamations of the unions to a situation where the issue is now addressed 
by a clause inserted in the agreement that allows flexibility across and between all 
departments.7 
This clause is complemented by the full recovery clause first inserted in the 1994 agreement 
and which today states that “the parties agree, that where practicable, additional costs arising 
from the 2000 national settlement will be recovered in full by efficiency and productivity 
improvements at company level. Such improvements can be wide-ranging in scope” 
(settlement ballot paper, 2000). The cost recovery clause has been the subject of some debate 
at conferences. In 1997 a composite motion was moved instructing the negotiating panel to 
have the clause struck from the agreement. The General Secretary made the case that the 
agreement would be in danger of being destroyed because the BPIF would not continue 
unless it was part of the agreement. The mover claimed that the clause allows the managers 
to attack the core terms and conditions of the agreement in the name of efficiency and 
                                                 
7 The clause in the agreement now reads: 
    
(a) The parties to this agreement place great importance on the training of GPMU  
        members to enable them to acquire the new skills to work flexibly. 
 
(b) Subject to suitable training and the necessary health and safety requirements, full   
                        flexibility of working between all occupations and the elimination of demarcation   
                        lines is accepted. 
 
       To this end management and chapels will agree arrangements to achieve these   
       objectives including full flexibility and where appropriate establish arrangements 
       for the necessary training and retraining of GPMU members. 
 
                        In accordance with the above, GPMU members may subsequently be called upon 
                        to carry out any of the duties within and between Craft and Classes I to III and 
                        transfer between machines, equipment and departments.      
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productivity. In reply the General Secretary made it clear that the clause was not to be used in 
this manner and that there had been ample correspondence with the membership but he was 
happy to reiterate that “such items as core money, temporary transfers, balancing of time, 
overtime rates, shift rates are not items that should be discussed as a contribution towards the 
National Agreement cost recovery clauses” (1997: p 101). Newsome reflects on this move to 
a more flexible approach to work in her study of Graphical unions on an international basis 
that includes the UK, and claims that “based on a desire to ensure continued company 
survival, the concern of the respective graphical trade unions in the study was not to reject 
out of hand shifts towards increasingly flexible forms of working. Alternatively the aim was 
to ensure that moves towards increased flexibility were negotiated and as a result remained 
within the best interests of the members” (2000: p 509). It would appear from the foregoing 
evidence that this is an accurate reflection of the bargaining position adopted by the GPMU 
and its constituent unions prior to amalgamation in order to secure advances in the terms and 
conditions for their members working under the national agreement.  
Through technological advancement equipment has been simplified and, from the employers’ 
point of view, requires fewer less skilled people to perform the tasks. This impacts on the 
workforce through there being fewer people to perform the tasks, which in turn leads to an 
intensification of work. Newsome refers to the very clear message that came across from 
respondents to her study that there had been an “increase in workplace pressure and a 
corresponding intensification of the work process” (2000: p 513). Newsome claims that 
many workers are responding to this intensified pressure on an individual basis rather than 
the traditional collective approach and that one aspect of coping with the stress is seeking 
extra training which she emphasizes should be on the union agenda to ensure “a wider 
collective response to the real causes of work intensification and stress” (2000: p 515). 
Newsome claims that there is still a ‘community of interest and identity’ among print 
workers, particularly in the craft areas, which allows traditional channels of representation to 
prevail and resist employer attempts to dilute trade unionism in the sector” (p 516). To a 
certain extent this is a situation that was found to exist in a survey undertaken by Healy, 
Telford and Rainnie in the Herts and Essex region where it became evident that, despite the 
conditions on flexibility contained within the national agreement, there was little flexibility 
of workers between departments, but there was evidence of flexibility within departments. 
This was more to do with management not pushing the issue, despite the existence of weak 
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chapel structures at many of the companies surveyed. Lack of chapel activity was highlighted 
through the findings in Healy, Telford and Rainnie’s local survey where the typical response 
to ‘why did you become Mother/Father of the Chapel (M/FOC)?’ was that no-one else would 
do the job.  
It is important to make the point that, from the trade union perspective, the issues of training 
and worker flexibility are intrinsically linked. Keep and Rainbird argue that the traditional 
organizational systems developed by UK trade unions, along occupational lines creating 
separate bargaining units for different classes of workers, led to “structures [that] impose 
constraints on occupational mobility and, in particular, limit the possibilities for semi-skilled 
and un-skilled workers to upgrade their jobs” and that consequently “moves towards 
increased flexibility and multi-skilling may be perceived as a threat to the spheres of 
influence of different trade unions and bring them into conflict with each other”. The authors 
claim that one logical resolution to this dilemma is for unions to merge in order avoid 
conflict between competing unions (1995: pp 532-533), a situation that the NGA and 
SOGAT faced and a solution they adopted. Keep and Rainbird go on to refer to the paradox 
that, in facing a hostile political climate, “the formal exclusion of trade union interest from 
training bodies has coincided with unions’ increased interest in, and awareness of, training as 
a bargaining issue” and that one reason for the adoption of this policy is that, because of their 
restricted position  “the generally weakened bargaining position of unions mean that 
bargaining strength is no longer sufficient to increase members’ pay and status. Strategies 
towards training therefore supplement wage bargaining” (1995: pp 535-537). The flexibility 
clause inserted in the ‘BPIF’ agreement is subject to training and health and safety 
regulation, ensuring that skill levels are maintained, and is supplemented by the union 
keeping training on the bargaining agenda in an economic and political climate that makes 
the use of a social rather than material agenda significant in maintaining the profile of the 
union in the workplace. 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper has concentrated on industrial relations in the general printing sector and has 
focused on the resilience of a multi-employer, national agreement that continues to impact on 
the sector and set the benchmark for terms and conditions of employment for workers in that 
sector. There is a historical overview of the progression of the national agreement that helps 
to emphasise the uniqueness of the agreement in comparison to trends away from this model 
of industrial relations in the wider private manufacturing and private services sector of the 
UK economy. It is argued that a possible reason for the persistence of the agreement is the 
structure and dynamics of the sector. General print is dominated by SME’s, who operate in 
niche markets with highly competitive wage and price structures and evidence is submitted to 
support the claim that this type of market is conducive with multi-employer bargaining. 
Industrial relations tend to be passive, despite the media hype attributed to printing which 
tends to mistakenly tie general print in with what was a more volatile newspaper sector.  
 
A central topic for discussion between the negotiating bodies has been that of manpower. 
The traditional stance of the unions was to restrict and control worker intake through 
apprenticeship quotas and maintaining closed shops, whereas employers sought concessions 
from the unions on this issue in return for improved terms and conditions. During the 1980s 
the emphasis changed and it was the unions who pushed for a more constructive approach for 
training and up-skilling to address skill shortages and skill gaps. This was a radical departure 
for the unions but has not yet been met with any great enthusiasm among apathetic 
employers. Flexibility, productivity and efficiency clauses became very much a part of the 
discussions since the 1980s. The employers sought concessions from the unions in order to 
create a more cost efficient competitive business structure; in return, the unions advanced 
conditions but, more importantly from their point of view, kept some control over the rate of 
change in the workplace. Work has to a great extent become de-skilled by technological 
change that in turn has led to a more 
intensified, stressful environment and the subsequent call for an improved training regime to 
improve job stability.  
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